Competitiveness agreements in France became a much discussed feature of company-level responses to the 2008 crisis and aftermath. Such innovations raise several issues in a context of multi-unionism, in terms of how different workplace unions of varying organisational cultures respond, but also the consequences for inter-union relations. It is observed that such dynamics are complicated by the representative reforms of 2008 which link local bargaining power to performance in workplace elections. Based on case study analysis of the crisis-ridden automotive industry, this article therefore examines how union responses to competitiveness bargaining is proceeding in light of the revised representative rules.
Introduction
The trajectory of bargaining decentralisation from industry to company-level to boost economic competitiveness has deep roots in France. Alongside a raft of regulatory reform, the 2008 economic crisis deepened this process further, signalled by the signing of several competitiveness agreements (accords de compétitivité) in its wake (Freyssinet, 2013; Ancelovici, 2014; Amable, 2016) 1 . The ratification of company and plant-specific competitiveness agreements in crisis-ridden employers raises questions around how increasingly market-exposed labour relations effect and potentially erode workplace institutions characterised by distinct and long-standing cultural traditions (Hauptmeier, 2012) . In drawing upon evidence, the article presents case studies of two headline competitiveness agreements from the automotive industry ratified after the 2008 crisis -at Renault and Groupe Peugeot Société Anonyme (PSA). These competitiveness agreements concluded in 2013, were hailed as among "the first of their kind" in France given their comprehensive and long-term encompassment of pay, working time and a plethora of shop-floor matters in exchange for investment (Eurofound, 2013; Broughton et al. 2013) . The agreements, signed under pronounced crisis, received significant attention 2 and were followed by others, predominately in the automotive supply chain, notably at Bosch and Michelin (but also other manufacturing sectors, like pharmaceuticals). The automotive sector was at the centre of adjustment pacts since the 2008 recession because, after banking and construction, the industry was severely affected and remains highly exposed to international competition and capital outflows (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010) . It presents an ideal site for investigating concerns around multiple union responses and inter-union relations.
The article presents as follows: Section Two reviews issues raised by the negotiation of competitiveness agreements under conditions of French multi-unionism, considering the impact of the representativeness reforms. Section Three outlines the case studies' methodology and Section Four details the findings. Section Six concludes with discussion.
Negotiating competitiveness agreements under revised representativeness rules
The evolution of bargaining and representativeness in the French context 2 Le Monde (2013) 'Renault: les principaux points de l'accord de compétitivité', Available online [https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/03/07/renault-les-principaux-points-de-l-accord_1844175_3234.html]; Libération (2013) 'Accord social chez PSA: vraiment gagnant-gagnant?', Available online [http://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2013/10/22/accord-social-chez-psa-vraiment-gagnant-gagnant_941478] Legacies of union victimisation by employers and internal fragmentation in the labour movement historically made collective bargaining problematic in France (Guillaume et al, 2018; Howell, 2009 ). Indeed, unions were only formally recognised as holding a workplace presence in 1968 with the provision of délégués syndicaux (union delegates) who hold power to negotiate agreements. The state had begun to establish company-specific representative structures to promote peaceful interaction between management and workers in 1936, leaving conflict between unions and employers outside the firm (Laulom, 2012) .
This process began with délégués du personnel (employee delegates, DPs), whose function was grievance-handling, followed in 1945 by the introduction of works councils, holding information and consultation rights. Positions in both structures are typically occupied by union activists, although there is variation across industries, and non-union DPs can be prominent in small and medium enterprises, although rare in large companies (DARES, 2018) . In 1966, the state attempted to enhance union legitimacy by awarding 'irrefragable representative' status to five confederations: the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du travail), the CFE-CGC (Confédération française de l'encadrement-Confédération générale des cadres), the CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens), the CGT (Confédération générale du travail), and FO (Force ouvrière).
Representativeness was determined by, inter alia, unions' membership numbers and length of existence (Béroud et al, 2012) , empowering those meeting the criteria to sign collective agreements. Given that sector-level bargaining dominated when the status was awarded, smaller 'representative' unions could sign agreements for entire industries, resulting in fragile agreements with little legitimacy (Labbé, 2001) .
Over time, successive policy initiatives devolved collective bargaining to company-level. The 1982 Auroux Laws obliged employers to bargain annually on issues like pay (Chambost et al, 2009 ) and heralded a shift to decentralised bargaining. It received a mixed response from the country's unions. Some, such as the CGT and CFE-CGC, viewed firm-level bargaining as a threat to their legitimacy (Barthélemy and Groux, 2012; Béthoux et al, 2013) . Other unions, such as the CFDT, used bargaining decentralisation as an opportunity to refocus its strategy towards a "syndicalisme d'adhérents" (member-based unionism) (Guillaume and Pochic, 2009; Guillaume, 2014) . With an emphasis on recruitment and members' participation in union action, this approach was deemed necessary by CFDT leadership to strengthen its local bargaining power vis-à-vis employers (ibid.).
Recent decades witnessed further reforms favouring company bargaining, again receiving a similar range of union responses. In 2004, the Fillon Law enabled company agreements to derogate from industry agreements in most areas of employment terms and conditions (Dirringer, 2016) . To better align pre-existing representative structure with company bargaining, the 2008 reform on Social Democracy and Working Time sought to bring unions closer to the workforce by modifying the representative status granted in 1966 (Boulin, 2008) . Local works council election scores became the measure of representativeness rather than affiliation to nationally representative confederations (Farvaque, 2016) . Although works council elections are not new to France's system of representation, this constituted the first time they were used to determine bargaining rights . Trade unions monopolise the first round of elections, with a second round only occurring if union candidates fail to obtain half the available votes. The 2008 law prescribed that unions need 10% of votes before they can participate in negotiating agreements, and collective agreements must be validated by one or several unions holding at least 30% representativeness. Initially, unions holding 50% or more were given powers to obstruct agreements struck between other unions and employers. However, the El-Khomri Law in 2016 raised ratification thresholds to 50%, and removed the right to obstruct 3 .
Larger unions such as the CFDT and CGT were welcoming of the 2008 representative reform, perceiving it as a way to 'crowd out' smaller rivals by their greater capacity to divert resources to electoral campaigns (Andolfatto and Labbé, 2008) . Squeezed by threshold requirements, smaller unions would be forced to consolidate with other unions through merger . Alternatively, the reform could allow smaller unions, particularly the so-called 'autonomous unions' unaffiliated with the traditional representative status, to expand influence at workplace level and amass bargaining power (Farvaque, 2016; Béroud et al, 2013) . Arguably this could prove a threat to unions previously guaranteed institutional security by encouraging more competitors into the electoral fray, fragmenting the vote and potentially weakening larger unions.
Competitiveness Bargaining in a period of crisis
These bargaining and representative reforms represent a continuing attempt by the state and employers to enhance labour flexibility amid persistent problems of national competitiveness (INSEE, 2014) . A reflection of France's lack of competitiveness is employers threatening délocalisation (relocation), a controversial development resulting in high-profile political pressure for indigenous companies to remain at home (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2005) . In exchange for doing so, French employers call repeatedly for greater cost (labour) competitiveness (Beaujolin-Bellet and Schmidt, 2012) fostering a favourable environment for a new round of competitiveness agreements since the 2007-08 crisis (Broughton et al, 2013) 4 . Indeed, the best-known experimentation on competitiveness agreements in France was on working time in the 1990s and early 2000s, driven by a need to comply with the government-regulated reduced working week instigated by the Aubry and Robien laws (Gilles, 2006) . Legislatively mandated working time reductions were introduced via negotiations in ways that did not harm company competitiveness (Freyssinet and Seifert, 2001 ). These agreements traded reduced working weeks for the creation or preservation of 4 For a European-wide perspective see Glassner et al. (2011) jobs, while also allowing adjustments for scheduling flexibility during less busy periods (Sisson and Artiles, 2000; Richevaux, 2001 ).
However, these working time competitiveness agreements were not driven by the financial circumstances of individual employers in crisis. In contrast, the post-crisis agreements emerging in the last decade were induced under conditions of economic recession, where the risks of job loss and plant closure were real and immediate. These types of competitiveness agreements have occurred among crisis-ridden manufacturers since 2008.
While incorporating similar measures to those agreed in the 1990s/2000s by linking working time flexibility with employment, these more recent competitiveness agreements cover a greater range of issues, such as pay, shop-floor organisation and training in exchange for guarantees of investment and employment preservation. Then-President Sarkozy actively championed competitiveness agreements in this period, arguing that they allow employers and employees to "talk freely" about employment, pay and flexibility 5 .
Further bargaining reforms reinforced this trajectory. In 2013, the Employment Securitisation Law allowed employers in "severe economic stress" to negotiate temporary competitiveness agreements permitting changes in working hours and wage reductions in exchange for job guarantees (Sauviat and Serfati, 2013:34) . Nationally, the CGT and FO criticised competitiveness agreements as wage reduction measures, refusing to support the Employment Securitisation Law, which instigated their negotiation in firms throughout the country. In contrast, the CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC national confederations supported the law, having signed the national 'interprofessional' agreement which formed the basis of the legal text (Freyssinet, 2013) . More recently, the El-Khomri Law provided legal priority to company-level agreements on working time, overtime pay, leave and rest, even if terms are less favourable to employees than those agreed sectorally. Again, union reactions to these laws ranged from the CGT and FO's outright rejection to more nuanced approaches from the CFDT, CFE-CGC and the CFTC focusing on balancing flexibility and security (Andolfatto and Labbé, 2016) .
Implications for unions: union responses and inter-union relations
How are union responses to competitiveness bargaining developing under the new representativeness rules? There are several strands to such an exploration which warrant unpacking. First, how might unions respond to the pressures of competitiveness bargaining?
One view from the literature on decentralised bargaining suggests that company and plant unions might move towards 'micro-corporatism' (Daley, 1999; Howell, 2009 ). Isolated at enterprise-level and exposed to job loss and factory closure, local unions become incentivised to cooperate with employers in ratifying competitiveness agreements. French unions' workplace presence is frequently weak, characterised by a paucity of members and activists, or 'virtual unionism' (Howell, 2009) , which is ascribed to legacies of sectoral bargaining (see also, Tallard and Vincent, 2014) . Fragile workplace unions are liable to acquiesce to the employer's competitiveness agenda, particularly if whipsawed with cheaper locales elsewhere. 'Negotiations' become little more than a façade for managerial unilateralism (See Pernot, 2018: 44, 49, 55-57 ).
An alternative view suggests local unions may respond to competitiveness bargaining differently. Rather than succumbing to a cooperative bias, local unions can overcome weaknesses by leveraging state intervention to protect employment and working conditions, particularly in high-profile employers (Parsons, 2013a,b) . French unionists may exploit a political climate sensitive to fears of globalization and an 'Anglo-Saxon' style race to the bottom via mobilisation (Parsons, 2013a) . As Pernot (2018: 57) notes, French unions at the very least retain their "discursive ability" to challenge employers with some remarkable evidence of radical opposition found in employers unlawfully confined and workers threatening to 'blow up the factory' (Pernot, 2018: 54) . Less accommodative responses to competitiveness bargaining would also be in keeping with a large part of the national (if somewhat stylized) industrial relations culture which associates bargaining with protest and mobilisation (Béroud and Mouriaux, 2001; Clift, 2012) .
Aside from this literature saying nothing about how different unions may be inclined to one approach over others, it also rarely considers how the new representative rules can potentially complicate union responses (Béthoux and Jobert, 2012) . The wishes of the local electorate may sway unions and -if recent polling is to be believed-employees may not approve of union actions perceived as 'too ideological' or 'too political' (TNS-Sofres, 2015) . This might weaken union branches' willingness to call for adversarial mobilisations for fear of being perceived as distant from employees' needs. Nonetheless, unions' utility may be questioned if they fail to adequately balance between concession and capitulation and descend into a micro-corporatist position. Too cooperative may risk being outmanoeuvred by more militant unions, capitalising on employee discontent.
The pluralistic structure of workplace representation in France also means that elected representatives must work with other unions, raising a second matter of inter-union relations.
Inter-union rivalry is well-known, driven by different organisational cultures and exacerbated by competition for votes in works council elections (Amable, 2016) . Organisational culture is understood here to refer to both the main cultural values associated with individual unions, but also their preferred repertoires of organising union action both in terms of internal union structure and preferred relations to employers (see also McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 91) .
As Swidler (1986 :273) notes, culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values towards which action is orientated, but by shaping a repertoire or tool kit of styles which actors construct strategies of action. In the main, French confederal union structure organises at national, sectoral (with various associating federal branches), company and plant levels. France's bargaining structure meant that national and sectoral levels traditionally dominated within each confederation, although the rise of local-level bargaining has raised the prominence of local-level delegates. There are, formally, significant differences across the unions. The CFE-CGC, a highly centralized union, views itself as nonpolitical, favourable to the 'middle classes' and a defender of 'merit' against the alleged 'egalitarian' postures of other unions (Béthoux et al, 2013) . It is a 'categorical' union representing only second (non-manual, supervisory) and third (managerial) colleges of staff 6 .
Although its orientation has shifted over the decades, the CFDT follows a "syndicalisme de proposition" (unionism of proposals), a 'pragmatic' vision emphasising results and compromise, reconciling the interests of the business with those of employees (Barthélemy and Groux, 2012; Rey, 2012; Ancelovi, 2014) . CFDT members appear to hold a cohesive view of union practices, values and political stances, in part because many dissenters left to join the autonomous Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques (SUD) (Barthélemy, 2012; Guillaume, 2014) .
While cognisant of internal tensions in the confederation, the CGT is regarded as pursuing a "syndicalisme de conquête" (unionism of conquest) with the intent of mobilising against the power of 'globalised capital' (Piotet, 2009 ). However, it is noteworthy that recent observations indicate that, in the private sector, the CGT signs almost as many companylevel agreements as the other unions (DARES, 2017; Laroche and Salesina, 2018) . The union has traditionally adopted a loose internal administration described as 'organised anarchy' (Thomas, 2013) and there are long-standing problems of cohesion and internal disunity (Bensoussan, 2009; Piotet, 2009 ). In contrast, Pernot (2010) argues that, while the CFTC's leadership remains close to a traditional Catholicism, the rank-and-file are moving towards more secular views to the extent that differences with CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO are blurring; a rapprochement with one of the latter is plausible. The CFTC (2017) indicates that it local unions are sovereign as this allows closer relations with the rank-and-file members. 6 'Colleges' refer to the electoral-representative structure based on proportional representation. There are separate electoral colleges for the three categories of employees (first: manual, second: non-manual and supervisory, and third: managerial). As a 'categorical' union, the CFE-CGC only requires 10% of the vote in the colleges it represents (rather than 10% of the overall vote like the other unions).
Finally, the FO's leadership describes the confederation as following a "militant reformism" situated between 'politicised reformism' and 'conflictual unionism' (Andolfatto, 2007:41) .
Scholars express puzzlement at the apparent paradox of FO's confederal approach of "contestation" and its grassroots' seeming preference for "contractual unionism" (Barthélemy and Groux, 2012:102) . Yon (2009) the fact that there may be a lack of agreement over preferred action vis-à-vis competitiveness bargaining, unions may fail to cooperate because of disparities in the need to do so, particularly in cases where one union commands majoritarian representativeness and can act without recourse to others. Thus, the picture for inter-relations appears uncertain and complex.
In light of the above, the following sections will explore these matters by asking how different local union responses to competitiveness bargaining are developing under the new representativeness structure and how inter-union relations develop given the combined pressures of competitiveness and representativeness.
Method and Case Studies Context
The 'how' nature of the questions lend itself to case study analysis (Yin, 2013:11) Seven unions are active across both firms (see Table 2 ).
While both employers' industrial relations histories are well-documented, some background comments are appropriate. PSA's history is complex and fragmented due to its merger with Citroën and Chrysler-Europe subsidiaries. Each of the three had their own separate employment relations policy in terms of classification systems, wages, pensions, and benefits, resulting from practices, tradition, or union victories linked to the history of each individual company (Loubet, 2001) . As a family business, Peugeot aimed to marginalise unions by a paternalistic approach, offering housing, transport and shops for food and other goods to its workers (Gallard, 2004) . Chrysler-Europe's subsidiaries Simca and Talbot, and to a certain extent Citroën, were governed by a strong internal 'yellow' union (Confédération française du travail, CFT, later forming part of Groupement des Syndicats Européens de l'Automobile, GSEA) which suppressed the CGT and attempted to quash industrial unrest (Loubet and Hatzfeld, 2002) . Hatzfeld (2016) describes the legal battle resulting from PSA's history of victimising CGT and CFDT representatives, where management discriminated against activists from both unions in terms of work duties, remuneration and career progression. Management also encouraged workers to join the other unions like FO, the CFTC and CFT (later GSEA) (Hatzfeld, 2016) . Over recent years, representativeness patterns at PSA have evolved. Increased prominence of research and development and high-end engineering roles as low-skilled assembly work is automated and offshored results in the rise of the categorical CFE-CGC as most representative union. Reflecting these trends, the CGT votes have waned, although it remains an equal second alongside FO.
Expropriated by the state and nationalised in 1945, Renault became a pattern-setter for labour relations in the country, with a history of company agreements often forming the basis for wider transposition across metalworking industry. As a state-owned company in the postwar period, Renault boasted a tradition as an innovator in socially progressive agreements, such as the 1955 firm-level agreement which guaranteed employee purchasing power through automatic cost-of-living adjustments (Freyssenet, 1998 ). Yet the company has also experienced militant union action, with many of its plants experiencing bitter strikes throughout history. Prior to the 1980s, management were relatively submissive to the thendominant CGT, 'buying' peace through wage increases following bouts of strike action (Hancké, 1996) . As Renault faced competitive crisis throughout the 1980s and 1990s and underwent privatisation (albeit with the state continuing to hold around 15%), new conflicts emerged. Successive CGT-led strikes against pay and production reforms failed, weakening its popularity among the workforce (Loubet, 2000) . Attempting to capitalise on declining morale amongst the CGT's support base, FO fortified its grassroots branches at Renault sites, pushing 'membership services' to attract new supporters (Hancké, 1996) . Similarly, the CFDT grew its base in the company in the 1980s and 1990s (Durand, 1996) . Yet the CGT's support remained sizeable, encouraging other unions towards ad-hoc cooperation on representative bodies, orchestrating block votes to ensure seats remained outside the CGT's control (Cornudet, 1991) . As at PSA, internal restructuring has produced the most meaningful change in union composition: the rise of the CFE-CGC.
Evidence Sources
Evidence for the cases is derived from fieldwork undertaken at company-level and at 12 assembly and powertrain plants over several years, examining a total 60 local union branches across seven unions (see Table 1 , for case study characteristics and Table 2 for an overview of union representativeness). Three sources were used in the fieldwork. First, documentation on negotiations provided by sector, company and plant union branches. Over 1,700 documents were collected, including union tracts (circulars) and workplace union publications. Documentation spanned the period 2008-2015, providing background and aftermath to the agreements. Media sources were consulted to gather contextual information. Second, evidence is sourced from semistructured interviews with 46 sectoral, company and plant delegates from the unions studied; these were purposively targeted to ensure a sufficient number of actors with relevant institutional positions and knowledge were represented. Third, observation of union activities during and after the agreements included attendance at industrial strikes, public protests, national, regional and plant individual union meetings and post-works council inter-union meetings and exchanges. Triangulation across various sources and different unions on the same issues supported the generation of a reliable account. Evidence was analysed via 'open coding' through cross-comparisons of 'methods of agreement' and 'methods of difference', whereby the former considered what was common across the fieldwork, whilst the latter focused on evidence lacking common features and outcomes (Miles and Huberman, 1994) .
The Case Studies
The case studies are presented sequentially, focusing within each company on unions' responses to the competitiveness agreements and their associated inter-union relations. We have this problem of high labour costs, high contributions and restrictive legislation. So if employees' demands put forward by trade unions become too high, an employer, who isn't a philanthropist, could go to a place where labour costs are cheaper, contributions aren't as high, regulation isn't as restrictive, and trade unions are less demanding.
GSEA If there were no signatures at all, management can make proposals but they won't be able to apply the measures. But we can't stop the CEO from saying 'if I don't make the factories competitive like I want, I will go and produce my cars somewhere else".
FO-PSA Delegate Interview
While the CGT continued to call for strike action after the agreement's ratification to demonstrate opposition, overall turnout was poor at just 500 workers; a development which Usually they make a big deal when agreements are signed, we believe that they didn't do so this time because they even know themselves that this is an unprecedented step backwards. It's been silence because they are aware that this obligatory division of annual leave is unpopular.
CGT-Sochaux Delegate Interview

Inter-Union Relations
Turning to inter-relations, the following patterns were observed. Prior to the agreement, the announcement of Aulnay's closure generated a cross-union company-level platform between the CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA entitled 'Come Together to Save PSA'. However, this was confined to a handful of joint statements criticising the CGT's actions at Aulnay involving a prolonged and sometimes violent strike in opposition to closure. The CFDT remained independent of the platform, partly because of historically poor relations with other unions at PSA, and partly because of internal division over whether to support the CGT-Aulnay. In any case, the platform was not sustained beyond a few weeks, because, as one participant observed, "each union works for itself" (FO-PSA delegate interview). Nonetheless, the platform was partially revived, albeit informally, during competitiveness negotiations, with the CFE-CGC, CFTC, GSEA, FO, and to a lesser extent the CFDT, sharing information on respective negotiating positions. Although no joint statements were issued upon ratification, individual signatories publicly commended each other for these coordinated efforts on information share and joint review. For example:
We were only able to sign this agreement because we worked, along with the CFE-CGC, GSEA and FO, to improve management's proposals to limit the effects of this 'new social contract' as far as possible. This is the type of participatory and responsible trade unionism with which we align ourselves.'
CFTC-PSA tract
This theme of responsible unions acting in alignment at company-level was not sustained however. Subsequent annual pay agreements found each union acting individually with no information share, joint review or coordination. However, at plant-level and as indicated above, signatory unions in Mulhouse, Sochaux and Rennes did utilise pre-existing electoral pacts to promote their 'responsibility' in signing the agreement in contrast to the 'grandstanding' of non-signatories. For example:
Why vote for the Rennes Alliance for the CE?... Because we do not regret signing the agreement which saved the site… Because we are participative and realistic, and don't try to make you believe in Father Christmas. The CGT is a confrontational union…they say 'I saw that the boss was bad, you are all victims, we have to rebel, we have to strike every week'…They are always the same, so it's not a constructive union.
CFE
CFDT-PSA Delegate Interview
Every time a decision is made, 99.8 per cent of the time, the CFDT follow the [FO, CFTC and CFE-CGC] .
CGT-PSA Delegate Interview
While the CGT attempted to obstruct the agreement's implementation via its activists on plant works councils, the CFDT withheld any support for this strategy. As a result, delegates from signatory unions could easily outmanoeuvre CGT oppositionary motions to agreement implementation at plant-level, effectively sidelining the militants' obstructionist strategy.
Renault Union Responses
How did Renault unions respond to the competitiveness negotiations at company-level? The CFDT, CFE-CGC and FO at company-level, commanding 65% representativeness willingly entered talks, but countered that the agreement hinged on volume commitments to guarantee jobs. In contrast, the CGT, commanding a fifth of representativeness shares, participated in the first round of talks before withdrawing when Renault proposed forced redeployment, increased working time and 7,500 job losses through natural attrition and early retirement. The CGT's initial strategy, alongside that of the CFDT, was to approach negotiations to discuss, inter alia, expanding research and development in France and the potential for ergonomic job redesign. Such issues drew little traction from Renault negotiators, and talks quickly became overwhelmed by discussions on terms and conditions.
Consequently, the CGT argued the agreement was a "social regression not to be supported" We were in the middle of PSA's Aulnay closure, so we didn't take Renault's threat lightly. However, we drew two red lines. First, to refuse the obligatory nature of mobility, which could lead to employees being made redundant if they refused. Next, because sites are under-utilised, we demanded firm and written commitments on volumes, because just talking about the sustainability of the sites left Renault the possibility to delocalise jobs.
FO-Renault Delegate Interview
The CGT again called for strike action which was then supported by the CFDT and FO who viewed it as a means of signalling the proposal's unacceptability to the employer, and calculating that government intervention was likely (hitherto, the state stood aloof from negotiations). The joint strike call mobilised 1,700 Renault workers in one-day action;
although the CFE-CGC refused to participate, arguing that long-term site viability would be served by competitiveness improvements than "politician's preferences" (CFE-CGC-Renault Delegate Interview). Union ambitions for the mobilisations had the desired effect, prompting state ministers to intervene to chastise Renault for using de facto compulsory redundancy to It's the same story when you read their union propaganda and when we interact with their delegates during central negotiations. On the employee side, just to calm them down, we read that they will not sign 'unless'... then we hear them say to senior management that they will most likely sign.
CGT-Le Mans Delegate
With agreement ratification at company-level weakening a strategy based on mobilisation, the CGT-Renault delegates encouraged local branches to obstruct transposition of the agreement at plant-level through their influence on works councils. The sectoral CGT federation (CGT-FTM, CGT-Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie) also initiated a legal appeal to the Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre on CGT-Renault's behalf over the implementation of the agreement. Both strategies proved unsuccessful however (see below).
Inter-Union Relations
Turning to inter-relations, the following patterns were observed. Prior to the agreement, the In contrast to FO, from the start the CFDT took full responsibility for the risk to employees by putting forward a bargaining agenda. All the same, we have to give FO credit for its main characteristic: being the champions of hypocrisy.
CFDT-Flins tract
In response, FO-Flins reproached the CFDT for "mak[ing] it out like it made all the progress on the proposed agreement by itself" (FO-Flins tract). In some circumstances, electoral rivalry also produced hostility with the CFE-CGC, when both the CFDT and FO attempted to attract votes from the second and third electoral colleges of workers (technicians and managers). As this is the electoral college upon which the CFE-CGC organises, hostility erupts over 'poaching' supporters.
In terms of plant-level unions opposed to the competitiveness agreements, CGT and SUD-Renault presented the relevant case. After the agreement's ratification, plant-level CGT branches and SUD jointly pursued strike action to obstruct its transposition. One CGT delegate described this CGT-SUD liaison as promising:
We talk, we manage to get along [with SUD]. In the future we'll be able to work together. That's the objective. At Cléon, like elsewhere, we've always been the CGT alone against everyone, but if we can have allies to change management's decisions, of course we'll do it.
CGT-Cléon Delegate Interview
However, the results of such strike action were limited: worker numbers involved were generally small and largely confined to the CGT's main strongholds at the time, with 100 participating at Sandouville, and 80 participating at Cléon. Smaller numbers (between 10 and 40) were involved at the other sites studied. The CGT and SUD also jointly pursued the aforementioned legal challenges, claiming the deal derogated from plant working time agreements signed in 1999, which could not be overridden unless formally repealed. This bargaining also raised a question over the consequences for inter-union relations: exposed to employer competitiveness demands at local-level, might different unions overcome longstanding rivalries to coordinate common responses? Again, the representativeness reform was assessed to potentially complicate this dynamic (p. 8-10). This discussion considers these questions based on the findings to derive some general conclusions. The section finishes with some general comments about the capacity of French unions to cope with pressures of globalisation via the mechanism of company-level competitiveness bargaining.
The majoritarian union response in both PSA and Renault points in the direction of microcorporatism. Renault and PSA's high degree of capital mobility, evident via factory closure at home and investments abroad, offers them the ability to coercively compare plants, placing inevitable downward pressure on unit labour costs. Recognising their lack of structural power to hamper the auto firms' competitiveness agendas, unions are forced into compromises weighted towards the employers' position (see also Greer and Hauptmeier, 2016) . In part, a "bias to cooperation" (Howell, 1992: 261 ) is a form of low-trust coercion stemming from employer threats of investment loss -which unions recognise as blackmailbut it is also a function of what Pernot (2018: 49) describes as due to unions who express "views more in line with those of employers (or with some social-liberal trends". The electoral rise of the CFE-CGC in the representative structure exemplifies this; a union whose outlook on the need for competitiveness closely aligns to the employers' given its 'categorical' (Pernot, 2018: 39) .
Adversarialism in response to competitiveness bargaining is also partially sustained by the electoral-representative structure, but again only at the margins. Even those unions opting to support competitiveness agreements are alive to this potential electoral threat and must avoid being seen as too accommodating to employers' demands to maintain credibility. This is evident by signatory unions' tendencies to dedicate many of their public pronouncements to defending their position on competitiveness bargaining vis-à-vis the stance of nonsignatories and temporarily sidestepping unpalatable agreement commitments in electoral periods. Furthermore, with multiple unions evidencing a concessionary bias, there is little expectation or need for unions like the CGT to sign competitiveness agreements, facilitating their oppositionary approach.
In terms of our second research concerns on inter-union relations under competitiveness bargaining, the findings indicate that overcoming traditional divisions and rivalry proved elusive, despite the commonality in individual responses among the majority of unions.
Competitiveness crises did not herald significant departures from traditional divisions.
Unions remain locked into their inherited identities, and so the weight of history casts a shadow over the contemporary immediacies of competitiveness bargaining. Negotiations on competitiveness did appear to elicit some cooperation among unions, but is transient and confined to shared reviews on negotiation progress, with no sustained attempts to formulate joint negotiation positions. While unions' public pronouncements are rhetorically positive about the benefits of inter-union cooperation in addressing competitiveness pressures, individual unions' priorities trump coordination.
The findings showed that inter-union differences are not merely a consequence of unions' respective inherited legacies, although these remain important: the representativeness rules accentuate inter-union difference and unions' prioritisation of their individual institutional security, thereby weakening the capacity of unions to jointly respond to competitiveness challenges. While the representativeness rules do create conditions in which some elementary inter-union coordination becomes necessary, this occurs where individual unions are too representationally weak to act independently, or to side-line the CGT. This is opportunistically motivated by representative circumstance rather a broader political vision for a coordinated labour movement responding to the challenges of globalization.
In summary, competitiveness bargaining, in the car industry at least, presents a situation where structurally weak unions, with fragmented and weak associational power, are locked into concessionary give-backs. However, those unions which are willing to ratify concessionary adjustments in competitiveness bargaining are also those which garner majoritarian support among the workforce. Within this pattern, occasional bouts of adversarialism persist, but on the margins and lacking major support. Unions remain unable to overcome divisions in confronting competitiveness bargaining. This is in part because they retain allegiance to inherited organisational cultures, but also because of the electorallybased system of trade union representativeness. At best, the representativeness system is insufficient to encourage sustained coordination among unions in responding to competitiveness bargaining, but, at worst, electorally-based representativeness is an institutional barrier to it.
Finally, one might infer from this study more broadly some conclusions about the capacity of French unions to cope with globalisation via collective bargaining more generally. Collective bargaining works best where the two parties involved are approximately equal in strength or at least forced by circumstance to develop an ongoing relationship with each other. When one party has plausible options to exit and attractive options elsewhere, the relationship becomes unbalanced and the weaker, less mobile party must give up or revise expectations previously established in order to sustain the relationship and retain the attentions of the mobile partner. Unless enmeshed in a broader web of supportive political rules and economic structures that moderate inequalities between the parties and constrain the mobility of capital, then workplace collective bargaining under conditions of market liberalisation cannot offer unions sustainable respite from globalization (see also Silver, 2003) . Even on their own terms, the competitiveness agreements do not deliver on union objectives. The combination of wage restraint, significant headcount reductions and working time extensions in the PSA and Renault agreements facilitated a decline in unit labour costs in both firms throughout their duration 9 , seeing French automotive labour costs fall behind those of Germany, while gross value added per thousand employees (as one measure of productivity) rebounded (CCFA, 2018: 28; 30) . Yet this has not helped to stabilize jobs in any sustainable fashion. Volume commitments are a poor measure of employment stabilization as the industry continually upgrades its labour saving potential and fails to replace natural wastage. More broadly, there is much to commend Pernot (2018) observation that an effective union response to the challenges confronting France's political economy would be one that transcends the confines of atomised collective bargaining at firm level to embrace and sustain a broader political vision on a sustainable economic structure. However, as he observes nationally, and we observe at company and plant-level, there is little sign that the French labour movement can lead such a project given it remains trapped by inherited identities and divisions. 
